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NOTE
The Case Against Intermediate Owner Liability Under
CERCLA for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste
Robert L. Bronston
INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 1 to address
the dangers posed by inactive hazardous waste sites.2 CERCLA
imposes both strict liability and joint and several liability3 for environmental damage on four general categories of potentially responsible partjes (PRPs).4 The four categories of PRPs include present
owners of environmentally contaminated facilities, 5 prior owners of
a facility who owned it at the time it was used for hazardous waste
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119 (stating that CERCLA's purpose is "to provide for a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and ... to protect public health and the environment from the dangers posed by such sites"); see also Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir.) ("Congress enacted CERCLA to address the increasing
environmental and health problems associated with inactive hazardous waste sites."), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992). Hazardous waste sites become "inactive" when they stop accepting discarded material. Congress addressed the problem of active hazardous waste sites
in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988) (providing that liability "shall be construed to be the
standard of liability which obtains under" § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(1988)). Although the statutory language is less than clear, courts have interpreted § 311 of
the Clean Water Act to impose strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Steuart Transp.
Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979). Similarly, courts have interpreted CERCLA's liability provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988), to impose strict liability
under CERCLA. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 n.9 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1071 (1990); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Most courts have
held CERCLA imposes strict liability and joint and several liability."). Although CERCLA
imposes strict liability upon potentially responsible parties, certain causation-based defenses
remain available to such parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(4) (1988); see also infra note 11.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988). CERCLA often refers to persons who may be
liable under these provisions as "potentially responsible parties." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(g)(l)(b) (1988).
5. This category of PRPs includes anyone who is "the owner and operator of a vessel or a
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1988).
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disposal,6 those owners of hazardous waste who contract for its removal,7 and any transporter of hazardous waste.8
Federal courts have divided over the scope of liability of prior
owners who did not actively contribute to the contamination of their
land. This controversy arises in one common factual context. In
this scenario, the original owner of the land generates hazardous
waste and thereby contaminates the property. A second owner
then uses the land for a different purpose, does not create any new
waste, and is not aware of the previous contamination. 9 During the
second owner's tenure, the previously deposited hazardous material
spreads via leaching or migration. Fmally, a third owner assumes
control of the land and retains ownership at the time of the required remedial activity.
Liability clearly rests both on the person who dumped the hazardous material10 and, in all but a narrow range of situations, on the
third, or current, property owner.11 The liability of the second
owner, however, presents a more difficult problem. CERCLA section 107(a)(2), the prior owner provision, imposes liability on those
who owned the land "at the time of disposal."12 Thus, in order to
determine the liability of intermediate owners, courts must determine whether the term disposal as used in the prior owner provision requires active conduct on the part of the owner or whether it
also includes the passive leaching or migration of previously deposited waste.
Federal courts have split on how to interpret disposal. The majority view, adopted by the Fourth Circuit, employs a passive definition, which holds that even passive migration of hazardous waste
6. This category of PRPs includes "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
7. This category of PRPs includes "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3) (1988).
8. This category of PRPs includes "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
9. If the intermediate owner becomes aware of the contamination of her land, she faces
liability under CERCLA § 101(35)(C). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988); see also infra
notes 117-20 and accompanying text. This Note addresses only the situation in which the
intermediate owner does not know that her land is contaminated.
10. Because the polluter owned or operated the site at the time of disposal, she therefore
faces liability under§ 107(a)(2). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988); see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
11. The present owner faces liability under§ 107(a)(l) unless she can prove that she was
covered by one of the causation defenses: that the disposal was caused by an act of God, by
war, by a third party, or by some combination thereof. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l), (b)(l)-(4)
(1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
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may trigger section 107(a)(2) liability.13 Several district courts and
bankruptcy courts, however, have applied an active definition of
disposal, holding that only prior owners who contribute to the risk
of environmental contamination by an intentional act should face
liability.14 Under this view, an intermediate owner who did not actively contribute to the contamination of the site should face no
liability because the migration of the hazardous waste did not result
from any of her actions. Courts have recently issued opinions on
both sides of the issue.15 Also, as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) continues to discover more sites at which passive
underground migration has occurred over several years,16 the fact
pattern at issue will tend to recur.
This Note argues that Congress intended disposal to have an
active meaning and therefore that courts should not hold prior intermediate owners liable for the passive migration of hazardous
waste under section 107(a)(2). Part I examines CERCLA's definition of disposal. This Part concludes that the language of the definition, though somewhat ambiguous, supports the active defuiition.
Part II considers the history of both CERCLA and the Resource
13. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir.),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992); CPC Intl. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269,
1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991}; Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 660-64
(E.D. Cal. 1990}; In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 381-82 (Banlcr. D. Mass.
1989), affd., 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991}, modified, 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.}, cert denied, 114
S. Ct. 303 {1993); cf. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 {4th Cir. 1984)
(applying the passive definition in the RCRA context); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055, 1070-71 (D.NJ. 1981) {holding that disposal as defuied in RCRA includes passive migration), affd., 688 F.2d 204 {3d Cir. 1982).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1350-53
(N.D. Ill. 1992); Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D.
Mich. 1991}; In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990);
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-58 {N.D. Cal. 1989}; Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 {C.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
1984), revd. on other grounds, 840 F.2d 691 {9th Cir. 1988).
15. Compare Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844-46 {adopting the passive definition) with Petersen
Sand & Grave~ 806 F. Supp. at 1351 (applying the active definition). Recently, the Ninth
Circuit expressly deferred rendering a decision on this issue. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992} ("Because the present
case involves the active disposal of hazardous material, we do not consider the passive migration question.").
16. See, e.g., Ralph Odenwald, Environmental Cleanup, N.M. Bus. J., July 1994, at 15, 15
(revealing that "New Mexico ... is uncovering hundreds of hazardous underground storage
leaks" and that "[n]ew leak sites are being discovered at a rate of five to 10 a week"}; Underground Storage Tanks: Guide To Evaluate Contaminated Sites and Quantify Risk Debated at
Workship, Cal. Envtl. Daily {BNA} {Aug. 16, 1994} {"In California there are approximately
19,000 sites contaminated by underground tank petroleum spills."}, available in Westlaw,
BNA-CED database. See generally Lois N. Epstein, Prepared Testimony on H.R. 1360, Safe
Aboveground Storage Tanlc Act of 1993, Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 14, 1994), available
in LEXIS, News library, Curnws File {discussing what industry and the states are doing to
address the problems posed by leaking aboveground storage tank facilities, why those actions
are insufficient, and why the EPA lacks the power to deal adequately with this problem).
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Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),17 which CERCLA
amended, in order to determine whether Congress intended to require affirmative conduct on the part of intermediate owners as a
prerequisite to liability. Part II concludes that although the history
of CERCLA sheds little direct light on the meaning of disposal, the
analogous controversy under RCRA indicates that Congress understood disposal to have an active meaning in the CERCLA statute.
Part III confirms this interpretation, concluding that the structure
of CERCLA supports the active reading of the definition. Finally,
Part IV demonstrates that the active reading of disposal is consistent with CERCLA's purposes. Courts should therefore interpret
the word disposal to require a showing of affirmative human conduct before imposing liability on intermediate owners under section
107(a)(2).
I.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE DEFINITION

In interpreting and applying statutes, a court must first consider
the statutory language.18 If the relevant words have a clear meaning in their context, this meaning should, and arguably must, control.19 To determine the scope of liability assessed under section
107(a)(2), courts must interpret its use of the term disposal. CERCLA defines disposal by incorporating the definition used in
RCRA:20
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into
or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into
the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.21

This Part examines whether this definition of disposal provides a
sufficiently clear meaning to end the inquiry. Section I.A considers
the argument that this language mandates a passive definition of
disposal. Section l.B considers the opposing arguments, that the
language of the statute suggests an active interpretation. This Part
concludes that the statutory language does not have a "plain mean17. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
18. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990) (referring to the "fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the
statute itself"}; Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989) ("Interpretation
of a statute must begin with the statute's language.").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("[W]here, as
here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms.'" (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988). CERCLA defines disposal in § 101: "The terms 'disposal', 'hazardous waste', and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act.'' 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988). The incorporated definition is
the one provided in the text.
21. 42 u.s.c. § 6903(3) (1988).
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ing," although the best reading of the text favors the active definition of disposal.
A. Statutory Language Supporting a Passive Reading
Courts applying the passive interpretation of disposal have relied on the inclusion of the word leaking in the definition of disposal. These courts reason that because CERCLA defines disposal to
include leaking - a word which typically does not denote active
human conduct - disposal must not require active human conduct.22 One district court23 that relied on this analysis when construing the word leaking in a state statute virtually identical to
CERCLA and designed for the same purposes summarized the argument as follows:
"Leaking" does not commonly imply an intentional act. Rusted barrels, radiators, [underground storage tanks] each may "leak" without
anyone's aid or knowledge; moreover, an unseen or unintended gravity-aided release from these containers would most naturally be called
a "leak." Were one purposefully to refer solely to a controlled or
intentional release of some substance, one would almost never use the
term "leak" to capture that meaning.... Therefore, the word "leaking," by itself, plainly includes and likely connotes an unintentional or
inadvertent release.24

This reasoning, however, does not acknowledge that the definition of leaking includes both an active component - "to let a substance (as water or gas) or light in or out througb. a hole, crevice, or
other opening"25 - and a passive version --;- "to enter or escape
through a hole, crevice, or other opening."26 When construed in
the active sense, the word leak thus implies an affirmative human
action that facilitates the escape of the substance. One could say,
22. See, e.g., CPC Intl., Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) ("The definition of 'disposal' adopted in CERCLA expressly includes 'spilling'
and 'leaking.' Therefore, the unchecked spread of contaminated groundwater ... qualifies as
disposal." (citations omitted)); cf. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.NJ.
1981) (holding in a RCRA case that "[b]y its plain language, the statute authorizes relief
restraining further disposal, i.e., leaking, of hazardous wastes from the landfill into the
groundwaters"), ajfd., 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
23. Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-n-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (construing a
Kentucky state environmental statute that defined disposal in a manner virtually identical to
CERCLA), vacated, 844 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D. Ind. 1994). See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01010(10) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991 & 1994) (" 'Disposal' means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any waste into or on any land or water so
that such waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the
air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.").
24. 796 F. Supp. at 1177.
25. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW lNTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN·
GUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1285 (Philip Babcock Gove & the Merriam-Webster Editorial Staff
eds., 1986).
26. Id. Note that the verb to leak would be transitive under the active construction and
intransitive under the passive construction.
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for example, "the owner of the tank leaked the oil by drilling a
small hole in the tank" or "the White House aide leaked the information to the press." In ordinary usage the distinction between the
two definitions rarely seems relevant. When construing CERCLA,
however, the choice between these definitions may determine the
result of a case in which a landowner has performed no affirmative
act to let the hazardous waste escape.27
Plain-meaning analysis cannot justify the selection of one possible definition and the rejection of other plausible alternatives. The
district court quoted above acknowledged later in the same opinion
that leaking could be subject to an active construction; but the court
maintained both that the passive definition was the more common
usage and that slight ambiguity should not disturb statutory analysis.28 Once one acknowledges a plausible alternative reading of the
statute, however, its meaning becomes less than "plain," and courts
should tum to other sources of congressional intent to interpret the
statute.29
Under another approach to construing the meaning of leaking,
and thus the meaning of disposal, some courts have arrived at a
passive construction by inferring from other words in the definitional list that Congress intended the definition of disposal to encompass a wide variety of phenomena.30 This argument emphasizes
27. It is also possible for even unintentional affirmative acts by prior landowners to incur
liability. See infra note 39.
28. Pantry, Inc., 796 F. Supp. at 1177 ("[O)ne might be quick to argue that it is possible or
reasonable to interpret the term 'leaking' to include an affirmative, intentional act also. That
fact does not create any relevant 'ambiguity'.").
29. If a statute is ambiguous - that is, susceptible to more than one plausible interpreta·
tion - courts must seek out other sources of congressional intent, such as legislative history
or the structure and purposes of the statute as a whole. See Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485 {1917) ("Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning,
the duty of interpreta!ion does not arise."); Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d 1288, 1293 (6th Cir.
1988) {"If we find that the statutory language is unambiguous, then that language is regarded
as conclusive unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. If we find
that the statute is ambiguous, we then look to its legislative history." (citations omitted));
Johnson v. Town of1fail Creek, 771 F. Supp. 271, 276 (N.D. Ind.1991) {"When the statutory
language is ambiguous on its face ..• the court should look to congressional intent in adopting the provision."); In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc., 135 B.R. 46, 65 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1991) ("Frrst, is the statute plain and unambiguous? •.. If the answer is negative, the court
must use all efforts to determine Congress' intent and obtain the best result."). In other
words, if the language does allow for more than one plausible reading, proper statutory interpretation requires the use of additional analytical tools.
30. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992). The Fourth Circuit relied on this same argument in an
earlier case construing the definition of disposal in RCRA:
The inclusion of "leaking" as one of the diverse definitional components of "disposal" demonstrates that Congress intended "disposal" to have a range of meanings, including conduct, a physical state, and an occurrence. Discharging, dumping, and
injection (conduct), hazardous waste reposing (a physical state) and movement of the
waste after it has been placed in a state of repose (an occurrence) are all encompassed in
the broad definition of disposal. "Leaking" ordinarily occurs when landfills are not con-
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the diversity rather than the commonality of the words comprising
the disposal definition. The definitional elements of terms like
spilling and leaking differ - in their passive nature - from other
verbs used in the list that require an actor. Thus, the argument
runs, one can infer that Congress intended the passive meaning of
leaking because such an interpretation furthers the breadth of diversity of the words Congress chose to include in the definition.
The order of the words within the definitional list, however, may
actually indicate that Congress intended the opposite. The placement of spilling and leaking between two active verbs - the words
dumping and placing31 - may suggest that Congress intended to
minimize, rather than to emphasize, the passive aspects.32
Thus, whether one focuses on the "plain meaning" of leaking, or
on the context of the term, a critical reading of the statutory text
does not obviously require the adoption of a definition of leaking
that would hold prior intermediate owners liable for passive migration of hazardous waste. The next section examines the arguments
made from the opposite perspective - that the language alone supports an active reading of disposal.
B. Statutory Language Supporting an Active Reading
Two separate approaches suggest that CERCLA's statutory language requires a showing of affirmative human conduct before liability can attach to prior owners under section 107(a)(2). Under the
first approach, one can construe the statute according to recognized
canons of statutory construction to implement the common elements of the words in the definition. Under the second approach,
one can focus upon the definition as a whole to determine Congress's intent. This section argues that these two approaches provide helpful evidence in support of the active interpretation of
disposal.

structed soundly or when drums and tank trucks filled with waste materials corrode, rust,
or rot. Thus "leaking" is an occurrence included in the meaning of "disposal."
United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984). Although less than
entirely clear - particularly with respect to the "physical state" element of "hazardous waste
reposing" - this argument relies upon the assumption that the words in the definition should
be given as broad a construction as possible.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
32. By interpreting the word leaking as widely divergent from, rather than consistent
with, its surrounding language, the Waste Industries court also violated the maxim noscitur a
sociis. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. Of course, a contrary canon suggests that
statutes should be interpreted in such a way as not to render any words superfluous. See
infra note 43. But cf. infra text accompanying note 39 (demonstrating how leaking can be
read consistently with surrounding words and yet still have nonsuperfluous meaning).
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1. Two Canons That Support an Active Reading
One method of evaluating the meaning of disposal involves interpreting the word leaking by attempting to render it consistent
with the other words in the definition in accordance with the principle of noscitur a sociis, which maintains that one may infer the
meaning of a word by examining the meanings of the surrounding
words.33 According to this principle, the words discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, and placing indicate the proper connotation of
spilling and leaking. Examining all of the words together illustrates
Congress's intent: all the verbs are transitive and appear to envision a human actor.34 The principle of noscitur a sociis indicates
that by including leak and spill among this group of words, Congress likely intended the active version of these verbs to apply.
Concluding otherwise would make leak and spill anomalous in the
context of the definition.
Another canon of statutory construction also favors the active
reading of disposal. The principle of ejusdem generis35 states that
when general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of
things, the general words are most properly construed as applying
to the same class of things as those enumerated. The district court
in United States v. Waste Industries3 6 applied this principle to the
disposal definition by interpreting leaking to encompass unintentional but active conduct:
33. The Supreme Court has relied upon this principle of statutory construction: "The
maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an ines·
capable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to
avoid the giving of unintended breadth to Acts of Congress." Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
367 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1961) (construing the word discovery in§ 456 (a)(2)(B) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 to mean only the discovery of mineral resources because of its proximity to the words exploration and prospecting); see also Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494
U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (construing the phrase reporting and recordkeeping requirements in the
Paperwork Reduction Act not to encompass disclosure rules because of its proximity to the
phrases information collection request and collection of information).
34. In applying noscitur a sociis to the disposal definition, one district court made the
following observations:
[T]he Court looks at its definitional components and finds that these three nouns (dis·
charge, deposit, and injection) and four gerunds (dumping, spilling, leaking, and placing), when read together, all have in common the idea that someone do something with
hazardous substances. Taking the clearest example, the Court notes that "placing'', read
in the context of the statute, means a person introducing - putting - formerly controlled or contained hazardous substances into the environment.
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
35. The Supreme Court has relied upon ejusdem generis when interpreting statutes:
"Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the
general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific
enumeration." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers' Assn., 499 U.S. 117,
129 (1991); see also Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S.111, 117 (1944) ("And, under the rule of ejusdem
generis, it is reasonable to construe the general words 'other obligations' •.. as referring only
to obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated.").
36. 556 F. Supp. 1301(E.D.N.C.1982), revel., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit opinion that overruled this district court opinion, see supra note 30.
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Using ... the principle of ejusdem generis, general terms, i.e. leak and
spill, must be read as containing the.elements common to the specific
terms, i.e. deposit, inject, dump, and place. That common element is
an act carried out by a person. Leak and spill evince the legislative
purpose not to require that the act have been intentional. Even under
the statutory definition, disposal requires someone's active conduct,
whether intentional or accidental, in the movement of hazardous
waste. Thus, the notion that each term contained in the definition of
disposal contemplates active conduct ·does not render terms such as
leak or spill superfluous. Those terms serve to provide broad coverage of disposal-related activities, so that one may not avoid liability by
pleading that the conduct was unintentionaI.37

This argument provides a nonredundant reading of leaking. For if
leaking and spilling require both active conduct and intent to cause
the consequences of the action, they add very little to the other
words - discharge, deposit, injection, dumping and placing - already included in the statutory definition.38 If leaking refers to affirmative conduct the results of which were not intended by the
actor, then each word in the definition would have independent
effect.39
These two principles of statutory construction suggest that
CERCLA requires a showing of affirmative human conduct before
liability under secti<?n 107(a)(2) may properly be imposed. This understanding of the term disposal receives additional support from
language that appears at the end of the statutory definition, considered in the next section.
2.

The Significance of the "Enter the Environment" Language

Focusing analysis on the use of the word leaking in the definitional list tends to obscure the importance of additional language at
the end of the definition. This language provides a valuable window into congressional intent. The full definition reads as follows:
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into
or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into
the air or discharged into any waters, inCluding ground waters.40
37. 556 F. Supp. at 1306 (emphasis added).
38. Providing a nonredundant reading of leaking is preferable because it gives effect to
every word in the statute. See infra note 43.
39. Although the concept of an affirmative act that has the unintended consequence of
disposing of hazardous waste may at first seem difficult to envision, such cases do arise. See,
e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir.
1988} (holding that a disposal may occur when a developer accidentally exacerbates contamination of a plot of land by preparing it for commercial development). Note also that the
actor would still intend to perform the action that causes the disposal.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988} (emphasis added}.
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The italicized language indicates that Congress envisioned two conceptually distinct phases in the process of environmental contamination. In the first stage, the polluter "disposes" of the waste, such
as by burying barrels at a waste site. This disposal renders the toxins capable of entering the environment - that is to say, it creates
the risk of eventual contamination. In the second stage, the hazardous pollution actually leaches or migrates into the environment.41
These two stages may occur simultaneously - the risk may actualize instantly - as would be the case if a landowner poured a barrel
of hazardous waste into a pond on the property. Such an action
undoubtedly constitutes a disposal. The language quoted above,
however, suggests that the second phase alone cannot be considered
a disposal. The actor must have created the risk of environmental
contamination to have disposed of the waste. The definition's
structure is essentially equivalent to defining disposal as the creation of an environmental risk "so that" such risk may materialize.
Holding that the process of migration itself constitutes a disposal would render the entire second half of the definition meaningless. The passive definition necessarily presupposes that a disposal
can consist of a direct emission of toxins from a container into the
environment without any action of the intermediate owner in creating the risk. Such a construction of the statute assigns no meaning
to the phrase "so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any
constituent thereof may enter the environment."42 This construction violates the established canon of statutory construction that
courts must read statutes in such a way as not to render any words
superfluous.43
Thus, a number of arguments militate in favor of interpreting
the statutory language to require active conduct on the part of intermediate owners before imposing liability. Although the active
construction of disposal seems more convincing, the plausibility of
the passive reading may prevent textual analysis from being solely
determinative.44 When the plain language of a statute is less than
crystal clear, courts often turn to the history of the statute to deter41. CERCLA refers to this second stage in isolation as a "release." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)
(1988). For a structural analysis of the light which the release definition throws upon the
meaning of disposa~ see infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) {1988) (emphasis added).
43. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle on many occasions. See, e.g., United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 {1992) (referring to "the settled rule that a
statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative
effect"); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 {1955) (holding that it is a court's
"duty 'to give effect if possible to every clause and word of a statute'" (quoting Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 {1883))); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1936) ("[W]e are not at liberty to deny effect to specific provisions .•••").
44. See supra note 29.
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mine Congress's intent with respect to the ambiguous language.4s
Part II therefore examines the history of the definition of disposal
to determine whether it can provide any help in resolving this issue.
!I.

THE HISTORY OF THE DISPOSAL DEFINITION

Ideally, the history of a statute will provide insight into congressional intentions that can inform a court's interpretation of statutory language. The conditions under which Congress passed
RCRA and CERCLA, however, render their legislative histories
confusing and contradictory.46 Both CERCLA and RCRA have
abbreviated and internally inconsistent iegislative histories.
Although the statutes' histories are tortuous, this Part nevertheless
concludes that the history of the disposal -definition supports the
active interpretation. Section II.A traces the compromises reflected
in CERCLA's liability scheme but concludes that CERCLA's history does not provide sufficient information to understand what
Congress intended with respect to the meaning of section 107(a)(2)
- the provision that imposes liability on prior owners who owned
the land at the time of disposal. Section II.B examines another legislative source in the development of the disposal definition,
RCRA, to determine whether the history of that law casts any helpful light upon analogous concerns in CERCLA. This Part con~
eludes that the evidence from RCRA's history supports an active
interpretation of diSposal.
A. Legislative History of CERCLA
CERCLA's whirlwind passage resulted in an absence of satisfactory committee reports discussing its liability provisions.47 This
section therefore seeks other insights into Congress's conception of
45. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("Where, as here, resolution of a
question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.")i
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989) ("If the statute is in any
way ambiguous, then the court must consider the statute's legislative history.").
46. Congress passed each act in haste at the very end of a congressional session. As a
result, neither statute's legislative history provides clear guidance as to the meaning of the
text. See VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAzARnous WA'irrE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION - A CoMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAW 5 (1992) (describing the harried
conditions under which Congress passed CERCLA); William L. Kovacs & John F. Klucsik,
The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 3 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 216-20 (1977) (same for RCRA).
47. See supra note 46. Over 25 senators hammered out the text in a negotiation held
behind closed doors, and Congress passed CERCLA with little discussion. FOGLEMAN,
supra note 46, at 12. The House of Representatives considered the bill under a suspension of
the rules; this device required the House to pass the bill, if at all, without any amendment or
alteration. Id. at 13. It is unclear why the House imposed a suspension of the rules, although
the decision may have been motivated by the concern that Senate support for CERCLA had
evaporated and that any House revision could effectively kill the legislation. See id. (describing such concerns on the part of Sens. Stafford and Randolph).
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the causation standard that applies under section 107(a)(2), the provision that imposes liability on prior landowners, because the standard of causation that Congress chose to apply could indicate
whether Congress intended to adopt the active or the passive definition of disposal. If Congress intended to apply traditional notions
of proximate and but-for causation to past owners, this intention
militates in favor of the active defiriition.48 This section offers evidence that several members of Congress did in fact envision such a
causation requirement but concludes that the statute ultimately remains unclear on this question.
Some evidence from the floor debate indicates that Congress
intended to require a showing of causation before liability could
attach to prior owners. Comments of at least two important CERCLA supporters appear to envision a causation requirement. Representative James Florio, who introduced H.R. 7020,49 the bill that
eventually became CERCLA, stated that "a strong liability scheme
will insure that those responsible for releases of hazardous substances will be held strictly liable for costs of response and damages
to natural resources. "50 A desire to attach liability to "those responsible for releases" would seem to require finding a causal connection between the original pollution and the release and thus
seems fundamentally inconsistent with the passive definition of disposal. Representative Al Gore - another key CERCLA supporter - also indicated during floor debate that he anticipated a
strict liability scheme with a causation requirement: "If one cannot
prove the defendant caused the damage which led to the suit, then
the strict liability standard is never triggered."51 In addition, at
least one CERCLA opponent assumed that the statute required a
showing of causation: "The Government can sue a defendant under
the bill only for those costs and damages that it can prove were
caused by the defendant's conduct."52
Although these individual members of Congress appear to have
envisioned a traditional causation requirement in CERCLA's liabilThe resulting debate served only to explain some of the major provisions of CERCLA to
members of Congress before the final vote. At no point did Congress explain why it adopted
RCRA's definition of disposa~ nor precisely what it intended by imposing liability upon prior
landowners.
48. Under the passive reading of disposa~ prior landowners face liability for the migration of hazardous waste that they did not create or bury and about which they knew nothing.
Because such landowners have no causal relationship to the environmental damage, evidence
that Congress intended for traditional principles of causation to apply would indicate that
these landowners should not be held liable. Such a result obtains only under the active interpretation of disposal
49. See Fom.EMAN, supra note 46, at 8.
50. 126 CoNG. REc. 31,964 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (emphasis added).
51. 126 CoNG. REc. 26,787 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore).
52. 126 CoNG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (statement of Sen. Helms}.
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ity scheme, Congress's ultimate intentions regarding causation remain unclear.53 The statements appear on their face to refer to the
entire CERCLA statute and would presumably refer to all four categories of PRPs. Yet, as discussed above, current owners of land
face strict CERCLA liability without proof of causation.54 It is possible that the statements referred only to the liability of prior owners, but such a coneiusion is dubious because the statements
themselves do not seem limited in their application.
Thus, the ambiguous legislative history of CERCLA does not
provide a definitive indication of Congress's intent in adopting the
disposal definition.· Another chapter in the history of the disposal
definition, however, may prove more illuminating: when O;mgress
passed RCRA in 1976 and created the disposal definition later imported into CERCLA, it may have intended one or the other meaning of disposal to ~pply. The next section explores this alternative
source of the disposal definition's history.
B. Experience Under RCRA
When defining disposal in CERCLA, Congress adopted by reference the definition of disposal contained in RCRA. 55 Examining
the use of the word disposal under RCRA may therefore reveal its
proper meaning under CERCLA.56 The controversy that divides
courts in applying the disposal definition under CERCLA whether Congress intended the disposal definition to include passive migration - has also arisen under RCRA, albeit in a slightly
different form. This section first provides a general understanding
of the role of disposal in the RCRA scheme by examining the section of RCRA in which disposal figures most prominently - the
"imminent hazard" provision. This section then explains the court
53. At least one court has found that Congress explicitly rejected imposing a causation
requirement in the liability scheme of CERCLA. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1044 {2d Cir. 1985). Although the court in Shore Realty expressly held that the
causation requirement is absent from all of§ 107(a), its reasoning appears to be limited to
the category of liability covering present owners: "We agree with the state ... that section
[107{a){l)] unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner .•• without regard to
causation." 759 F.2d at 1044. The Shore Realty court discounted Senator Helms's remarks
either as being "a rear guard action" or possibly as referring to the causation defenses provided in§ 107{b) of the Act. 759 F.2d at 1045 n.19; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607{b) {1988); see also
Anthony J. Fejfar, Landowner-Lessor Liability Under CERCLA, 53 MD. L. REv. 157, 194
(1994) {dismissing Sen. Helms's statement). The Shore Realty court rendered its decision in
1985 and thus did not have the benefit of examining the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the
effects of which are considered in Part III. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text
54. See supra note 11. See also Shore Realty, 159 F.2d at 1044 {holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a){l) does not impose a causation requirement).
55. See supra note 20.
56. If, in defining disposa~ the RCRA Congress intended it to include passive migratiqn,
it seems logical to infer that a subsequent Congress that borrowed the identical wording of
the definition shared the same intent on this issue.
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decisions defining disposal under RCRA and surveys RCRA's
structure in an attempt to discover whether Congress intended the
disposal definition in RCRA to cover passive migration. This section concludes that the history of RCRA supports an active interpretation of disposal.
1. The Disposal Controversy Under RCRA
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, four years before CERCLA,
as a comprehensive solution to the regulation of hazardous waste
disposal.57 RCRA primarily regulates ongoing disposal of hazardous waste. Eventually, however, the EPA decided to use RCRA to
seek cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites as well.58 The EPA
used as its main weapon section 7003 of RCRA,59 known as the
"imminent hazard provision":
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of
evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the
United States ... to immediately restrain any person contributing to
the alleged disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal or to take such other action as may be
necessary.60
The breadth with which one construes the word disposal in this pro-

vision determines the breadth of the EPA's power under RCRA to
order relief at inactive waste sites. If disposal includes passive migration, the EPA could use RCRA's imminent hazard provision to
order the cleanup of long-inactive sites. Put differently, if Congress
intended for RCRA's imminent hazard provision to apply to inactive waste sites, then Congress must have intended the term disposal in RCRA to have a passive meaning.61 Given the magnitude of
57. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 {1976), reprinted in 1916
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6239 {"The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 is a mul·
tifaceted approach toward solving the problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of dis·
carded materials generated each year ..•."); see also Richard deC. Hinds, Liability Under
Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 15 {1982).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980)
(allowing the EPA to use the imminent hazard provision to mandate intervention at an inactive site).
59. See J.B. Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner, 45 Sw. LJ.1129, 1134-35 (1991)
("Prior to enactment of CERCLA in 1980, the EPA attempted to force cleanup of several of
the worst known contaminated sites under RCRA.•.. In the absence of any broad cleanup
authority such as CERCLA, the EPA relied on the RCRA [imminent hazard) provision with
limited success to achieve basically the same objective.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added).
61. Recall that in CERCLA cases, the statute requires cleanup of the hazardous waste
site; the only issue hinging on the disposal determination is the joint and several liability of
one party. See supra note 3. By contrast, in RCRA cases the disposal definition determines
whether an inactive hazardous waste site will receive any attention whatsoever.
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the problem caused by hazardous waste disposal at abandoned
sites,62 it should not be surprising that courts attempted to construe
the disposal definition under RCRA so as to promote liability.63
The next section, however, demonstrates that Congress did not intend RCRA's imminent hazard provision to cover inactive waste
sites; therefore, disposal in this provision has an active meaning.
2.

The Meaning of Disposal Under RCRA

Because RCRA's legislative history provides little insight into
the intended meaning of disposal, 64 this section considers evidence
derived both from RCRA's structure and from the actions of subsequent Congresses that indicates that Congress only intended for
RCRA to apply to active waste sites.
Four elements of RCRA's structure suggest that Congress did
not intend courts to apply RCRA to inactive waste sites. First,
Congress cast the language of the imminent hazard provision in the
62. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (referring to "a major new source of environmental concern ... :
the tragic consequences of improper[ ], negligent[ ], and reckless[] hazardous waste disposal
practices known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem'"); H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra
note 57, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6239 (referring to "the problems associated
with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year").
63. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.NJ. 1981), affd., 688 F.2d 204
{3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).
The desire of the courts to expand liability to implicate all possible defendants emerges with
particular clarity in United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 {4th Cir. 1984)
("Limiting the government's enforcement prerogatives to cases involving active human conduct would open a gaping hole in the overall protection of the environment envisioned by
Congress, a protection designed to be responsive to unpredictable circumstances."). Ultimately, of course, Congress addressed the concerns of these courts when it passed CERCLA
in 1980.
Another factor that may explain courts' expansive interpretation of the imminent hazard
provision i~ that in some cases the owner of the land at the time liability attached also had
been the entity responsible for contaminating the land. See, e.g., Solvents Recovery, 496 F.
Supp. at 1130-31. Thus, a RCRA imminent hazard provision defendant may have differed
significantly from the typical CERCLA § 107{a)(2) defendant in that the latter was much
more likely to be "innocent." Innocent here means only that the defendant was not a polluter and did not know about the environmental contamination; this should not be confused
with the somewhat more stringent definition incorporated in the' "innocent landowner defense" discussed infra at notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
64. Like CERCLA, RCRA presents an elusive subject upon which to perform a meaningful legislative history analysis. Congress passed the Act during the final days of a congressional session. See Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 46, at 219-20. The final version of the
RCRA bill resulted from an informal House-Senate compromise and did not receive the
benefit of a conference committee. See id. at 219. The House of Representatives, in a lastminute vote, passed the compromise legislation without a single member having read the
final version. See id. at 220.
As a result of this hasty and tumultuous passage, RCRA possesses little meaningful legislative history. In fact, the legislative history of the original Act contains no specific discussion
of the scope of the imminent hazard provision and no mention of the reasons underlying its
insertion. See Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 165. RCRA's overall structure, however, does provide help in interpreting the definition of disposal.
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present tense. 6s The language of the provision - "the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States ... to immediately
restrain any person contributing to the alleged disposal"66 - applied on its face solely to currently occurring activity. No potential
defendant could be currently "contributing to" an inactive waste
site. It therefore seems unlikely that Congress intended the provision to apply to inactive sites.
Second, the location of the imminent hazard provision within
the Act also indicates that Congress did not intend for the Act to
apply to inactive sites.67 The provision appears in a portion of the
Act entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions." The substantive requirements of the Act are located elsewhere. Had Congress intended for
the provision to have the broad scope assigned to it by the EPA and
some courts, it likely would have placed the provision within the
parts of the Act that establish substantive requirements and provide
for criminal and civil penalties.68
Third, the fact that the imminent hazard provision immediately
follows the citizen suit provision has led at least one court to conclude that Congress intended the imminent hazard provision to be
predominantly jurisdictional in nature, providing an otherwise unavailable federal forum to cover emergency situations.69
Finally, Congress did not draft the language of the imminent
hazard provision especially for RCRA; similar provisions appear in
other environmental statutes.70 It seems highly unlikely that Congress would have used this kind of boilerplate language to enact
such an important substantive legal change - that is, allowing the
EPA to address inactive waste sites.
In addition to these structural considerations, there exists some
additional evidence of Congress's view of the scope of the imminent
hazard provision. In the course of amending RCRA in 1980, the
65. Several courts have commented on the importance of the tense in which the imminent hazard provision was drafted. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 556 F. Supp.
1301, 1307 (E.D.N.C. 1982), revd., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F.
Supp. 1055, 1070 (D.NJ. 1981}, affd., 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(Supp.II1978} (emphasis added}. Congress amended this provision
in 1984 to recast it in both present and past tense. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 402, 98 Stat. 3221, 3271. This subsequent change,
however, does not reflect either the intent of the RCRA Congress or the intent of the Congress that incorporated RCRA's understanding of disposal into CERCLA in 1980.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143-44
(N.D. Ind. 1980) (inferring that the imminent hazard provision is jurisdictional in nature because of its location with miscellaneous provisions rather than with standard-creating substantive provisions and because it is located next to a provision conferring standing).
68. For examples of these sections, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925 (1988). For a fuller version of this argument, see Midwest Solvent Recovery, 484 F. Supp. at 144.
69. See 484 F. Supp. at 143-44.
70. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act
§ 1431, 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1988).
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Senate Environment and Public Works Committee explained the
scope of the imminent hazard provision by announcing that it incorporated common law standards of liability.71 Although the report
in fact indicates that the committee intended the liability standard
with respect to persons contributing to disposal to be broader than
at common law,12 the example the report gives still contemplates
that such persons "had knowledge of the illicit disposal or failed to
exercise due care in selecting or instructing the entity actually conducting the disposal." 73 This language is more consistent with an
active definition of disposal than with a passive definition, because
it envisions landowners who have actual knowledge of the disposal
or fail to exercise care with respect to the entity actually conducting
the disposal. Those who own the land while toxic waste migrates
unbeknownst to them by definition do not have such knowledge
and cannot fail to act with care with respect to the conduct of a
disposal about which they know nothing.
The final evidence of Congress's intent in fashioning RCRA's
imminent hazard provision may be found in the legislative history
of CERCLA. A report accompanying the bill that eventually became CERCLA examined the need for new law in the area of inactive waste sites: "Since enactment of [RCRA], a major new source
of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of
improper[], negligent[], and reckless[ ] hazardous waste disposal
practices known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem.' ...
Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive
problem."74
This report suggests that Congress did not intend RCRA's imminent hazard provision to address the problems posed by inactive
waste sites. If the provision could be used to order the cleanup of
abandoned or inactive sites, RCRA itself would not be "inadequate
to deal with this massive problem." 75 That is, if the definition of
71. S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019,
5023. The Supreme Court has observed that "particularly ... when the precise intent of the
enacting Congress is obscure," the views of subsequent Congresses "are entitled to significant
weight." Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980); see also Bell
v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983) ("Of course, the view of a later Congress does not
establish definitively the meaning of an earlier enactment, but it does have persuasive
value.").
72. S. REP. No. 172, supra note 71, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5023.
73. Id. In addition, the fact that Congress envisioned disposal as the type of activity that
an "entity" would need to "conduct[]" also indicates that Congress intended the active reading of disposal to apply.
74. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. In the course of the debate over CERCLA, individual members of
Congress made statements along similar lines. See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REc. 30,931 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) ("[T]here is no procedure for dealing with dangers posed by ... past
disposal of chemical wastes.").
75. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 74, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120.
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disposal included passive migration, RCRA's imminent hazard provision would indeed be adequate to cover inactive sites. Thus, the
enactment of CERCLA itself provides the strongest argument that
Congress did not understand the word disposal in RCRA to include
passive migration.76
The history and structure of the disposal definition thus indicate
that Congress intended for an active definition of disposal to apply.
Originally, Congress employed the disposal definition in RCRA to
allow the EPA to address instances of ongoing contamination at active waste sites. Congress then placed an identical definition in
CERCLA. Although CERCLA's messy history does not provide
much new information, it seems logical that Congress would expect
identical language to have the same meaning in CERCLA that it
did in RCRA.
III. THE STRUCTURE

OF

CERCLA

This Part argues that the structure of CERCLA supports the
active reading of disposal. 77 Section III.A examines uses of the
term disposal in the statute outside section 107(a)(2) and concludes
that these. other references support the active interpretation. Section III.B analyzes the role of section 107(a)(2) within CERCLA's
general liability scheme and concludes that the contextual relationship between the categories of PRP liability embodied in sections
107(a)(l) and 107(a)(2) confirms Congress's intention to employ
the active reading of disposal. Finally, section III.C explores the
76. The fact that Congress considered RCRA inadequate and created CERCLA to remedy the problem of inactive waste sites could imply that Congress intended the disposal definition in CERCLA to have a broader scope than it did in RCRA. Upon closer analysis,
however, this theory must fail. Had Congress intended disposal to possess a broader meaning under CERCLA than under RCRA, it would not likely have incorporated the same definition without any clarifying statement. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. One
might also argue that Congress intended to codify a broad interpretation of disposal already
reached by courts when Congress selected the same text for CERCLA. Most of the cases
adopting the passive interpretation of disposal under RCRA, however, were decided after
Congress passed CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.NJ. 1981); United States v. Midwest
Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
77. Looking to the structure and purpose of statutes as a whole enables courts faced with
ambiguous provisions to adopt interpretations with the greatest fidelity to the congressional
intent underlying the statute. For the general proposition that courts should analyze statutes
by examining the statute as a whole, see Helvering v. New York 'Ihlst Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464
(1934). See also United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme - because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context
that makes its meaning clear or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." (citations omitted}); Kenneth
W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEo. WASH,
L. REv. 703, 706 (1988) ("[S]tatutes are to be studied carefully, as a whole, and with due
regard for the structure of the statutory edifice and the interpretive lessons to be drawn from
that edifice.").
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significance of the "guilty prior landowner" provision and infers
from it that Congress assumed that the active reading of disposal
would apply, because only this reading avoids bizarre results.
A. CERCLA's Other Uses of Disposal
The word disposal, or a close variation thereof, occurs eight
times in CERCLA other than in section 107(a)(2).78 In each case,
when using the word disposal, the statute clearly contemplates an
environmental polluter taking active steps to rid itself of contaminated material.79
·
1.

Use of the Word Disposal in the Innocent Landowner Defense

In 1986, Congress extended the duration of CERCLA by enacting the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA).80 As part of the SARA amendments, Congress modified
the CERCLA liability scheme by providing narrow exemptions for
certain classes of persons otherwise liable. One such exemption reflects Congress's desire to free from liability those "innocent" current owners of land who did not produce any waste and who, in
good faith, had no knowledge that a previous landowner had buried
waste on the land.81 Congress accomplished this exemption by first
defining the class of transactions in land that would result in liability and then creating an exception for innocent purchasers. This
"innocent landowner exemption," which appears in a modification
to the definitional section of CERCLA, provides that purchasers
are liable for the land they acquire unless they can show, inter alia,
that "the real property on which the facility concerned is located
was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of
the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility." 82
Congress clearly intended the above provision to exempt from
liability purchasers who acquired the land after the relevant polluting activity had taken place. Congress expressed this intention,
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9)(B), 9601(22), 9601(23), 9601(35)(A), 9603(c), 9607(a)(3),
9607(a)(4), 9622(g)(l)(B)(ii) (1988).
79. For an example of a court conducting this type of analysis on CERCLA's use of
disposal, see United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
80. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
Although the legislative history of SARA does not approach the chaos of the legislative
histories of CERCLA and RCRA, it is still far from a model of clarity. See FOGLEMAN,
supra note 46, at 13-20.
81. See, e.g., 131 CoNG. REc. 34,715-17 (1985) (discussing both innocent landowner and
innocent purchaser exceptions).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). Section 101(35) of CERCLA defines contractual relationship as including, but not being limited to, "land contracts, deeds or other instruments
transferring title or possession" with the exception quoted in the text. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)
(1988).
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however, by requiring that the exemption apply only to innocent
purchasers who receive the land after "disposal" of the hazardous
waste. If disposal incorporates passive migration, virtually no one
could qualify for this defense because the passive migration could
well occur or continue to occur dufing the innocent purchaser's
ownership. As one court has noted, only purchasers fortunate
enough to purchase land where the buried waste was contained in
concrete - and thus incapable of migration - could assert the defense if courts adopted the passive definition of disposal. 83
By referring in these amendments to a period of time "after the
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance,"84 Congress clarified two issues. First, Congress envisioned disposal as a discrete
act, with distinct beginning and ending points. Construing disposal
to incorporate passive migration would eliminate any period of
time "after the disposal." 85 Second, Congress appears to have
viewed the process of disposal as being akin to the concept of placement,86 which requires an affirmative act, further suggesting that
Congress envisioned disposal as requiring active conduct.
2.

Use of the Word Disposal in the De Minimis Settlement
Provision

Section 122 of CERCLA, also added as part of the SARA
amendments, provides the EPA with authority to enter into an expedited settlement with PRPs who do not figure prominently in the
contamination of inactive hazardous waste sites. 87 A PRP's contribution to the contamination of the site may be considered de
minimis in two different cases. Either the PRP has contributed a
quantity of waste that, in physical amount and adverse environmental effect, is "minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances
83. See Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1352.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
85. This argument would fail, of course, if periods of passive migration also had distinct
beginning and ending points. Although one could probably identify the beginning point of
passive migration with reasonable certainty, the movement of the hazardous waste tends to
continue in such a way as to render the identification of an ending point all but impossible.
See Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1352 (noting that because passive migration is
constant, only prior owners lucky enough to have the waste on their land enclosed in concrete could escape liability under the passive reading of disposal); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L.
James & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (W.D. La. 1993) (acknowledging that rainfall causes
passive migration of hazardous materials on a near-constant basis, but declining to attach
§ 107(a)(2) liability on that fact alone).
86. Although Congress used the disjunctive in linking the words placement and disposal,
reference to the disposal definition reveals that Congress intended for placement to be a
subsidiary component of disposal Congress defined disposal as "the discharge, deposit, in·
jection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988)
(emphasis added).
87. 42 u.s.c. § 9622(g)(l) (1988).
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at the facility," 88 or the PRP is a present owner who "did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or
disposal" of the hazardous waste and who "did not contribute to
the release ... through any action or omission."89 The provision
thus provides a route to quick settlements for very minor polluters
and for certain landowners who are otherwise faultless but cannot
satisfy the innocent landowner defense. A later portion of this section confirms that the settlement provision targets innocent present
landowners: PRPs are not eligible for expedited settlements under
the statute if they "purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowledge that the property was used for the generation,
transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous
substance." 90
The structure of the de minimis settlement provision supports
an active reading of disposal.91 Congress explicitly limits the innocent landowner eligibility for expedited settlement to present owners of contaminated land. If prior landowners faced liability for
passive migration under section· 107(a)(2), this limitation would
seem bizarre; no principled ground exists for allowing innocent
present landowners to settle their liability cheaply and quickly
while denying this benefit to innocent prior landowners. Thus, the
fact that Congress limited that part of the statute to innocent present owners strongly suggests that Congress did not intend for innocent prior owners to be PRPs at all.92
3.

Use of the Word Disposal in the Definition of Facility

The statute's definition of a "facility" that may require cleanup
pursuant to CERCLA includes "any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed." 93
The inclusion of disposed of in this list of verbs indicates that Congress envisioned disposal as requiring an actor. The words surrounding disposed of - deposited, stored, and placed - all require
an actor. If courts interpret disposal in such a way as to make it
harmonize with its surrounding language, as the principle of noscitur a sociis dictates,94 then courts should construe disposal to re88. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(A) (1988).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
91. See Ruhl, supra note 59, at 1143-44. In addition, the grouping of disposal with the
words generation, transportation, storage, and treatment supports the active definition to the
extent that the words obviously all share active characteristics.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 116-22 (arguing that Congress never intended to
make innocent prior owners PRPs).
93. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(9)(B) (1988).
94. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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quire the same affirmative conduct required by depositing, storing,
and placing.
4.

Use of the Word Disposal in the Definition of Removal

Disposal appears in CERCLA a fourth time when Congress defined removal by listing a series of acts, including "the disposal of
removed material." 95 The definition of removal explicitly labels a
disposal as a type of "action[ ]."96 The act or action of disposal requires an actor to do the disposing; a definition of disposal that encompasses passive migration, which occurs even without an actor,
seems inconsistent with such a provision.
5.

Use of the Word Disposal in CERCLA 's Generator PRP
Category

The third category of PRPs on whom CERCLA imposes liability includes "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter
for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person. "97 Conceiving of disposal as
the type of activity for which one would need to "arrange[]" clearly
implies an active definition of disposal.
6.

Use of the Word Disposal in CERCLA's Transporter PRP
Category

The fourth category of PRPs on whom CERCLA imposes liability includes "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities."9 8 This
section, which envisions facilities at which hazardous waste is either
recycled - through "treatment" - or eliminated - through "disposal" - presupposes an actor at the facility to perform the desired
task. It thus appears to support the active reading of disposal.
95. The statute defines removal, in part, as:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, ... such
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such
other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or
threat of release.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988) (emphasis added).
96. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(23) (1988).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
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Use of the Word Disposal in CERCLA's Notification
Requirement

Section 103(c) of CERCLA requires PRPs to notify the EPA of
the existence of "a facility at which hazardous substances ... are or
have been stored, treated, or disposed of."99 As with the definition
of facility itself,100 in order to construe disposed of consistently with
its surrounding words - stored and treated - one must interpret
the term to require an affirmative act.
8. Use of the Word Disposal in the Definition of Release
The eighth instance of the word disposal in CERCLA occurs in
the statute's definition of release. Release forms a critical part of
CERCLA's liability scheme; the statute imposes liability on the
four categories of PRPs only for damages resulting from a release
or threat of release.101 CERCLA defines release as follows:
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant).102

The above definition contains several significant features. Some
words in the above list truly admit of no active component.103 For
instance, leaching and escaping require no affirmative conduct;
these are intransitive verbs. The fact that the definition of release
contains words with active meanings and words with passive meanings, combined with the fact that one of the words is disposing,
leads to a second conclusion: Congress intended release to have a
broader meaning than disposaf.104
The contrast between the language used in the two definitions is
quite revealing. Release, a broader concept than disposal, clearly
includes both active and passive components. The language of the
disposal definition, on the other hand, appears ambiguous on this
point. If release is broader than disposal, and release already in99. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1988).
100. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
101. PRPs face liability for, inter alia, "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including tbe reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) {1988) (emphasis added}. The definition continues by excluding certain occurrences, none of which are relevant to the present discussion.
103. Although some courts make a similar claim for tbe words in the disposal definitional
list, see, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 {4th Cir.}, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992), the words leak and spill are ambiguous in that they possess
alternative meanings with active components. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 n.2
(N.D. Ill. 1992) ("What is clear is that 'release' was meant to be more inclusive than
'disposal.' ").
'
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eludes explicitly passive components, it makes sense to conclude
that disposal is limited to its active meaning. Interpreting disposal
to include passive migration collapses the disposal definition into
the release definition, for if one were to impute passive components
into the disposal definition, disposal and release would become operationally interchangeable; no meaningful difference would exist
between the two terms. This result, however, makes little sense, for
Congress would not have created a separate definition for disposal
if it intended for that word to mean the same thing as release. 10s
The use of the words into the environment in the release definition further reveals its broad scope. Recall that Congress selected
different language - "so that such solid waste or hazardous waste
or any constituent thereof may enter the environment" 106 - in defining disposal. 107 Once a landowner has filled tanks with hazardous waste, the material has not entered the environment, but the
potential for contamination exists. 1os A release - not another disposal - occurs when a rupture in the tank causes the hazardous
material passively to migrate "into the environment." In fact, this
language refers so clearly to passive migration that Congress added
an explanatory phrase - "including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant" 109 - to
make clear that release also included the smaller and distinct co·ncept of disposal.
The contextual difference between release and disposal thus elucidates Congress's intent in drafting section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA.
Had Congress desired to include passive migration as part of this
section of the liability scheme, it would have held previous owners
liable if they owned the land at the time of any release. Congress
declined this approach, deciding instead to limit prior owner liability to ownership at the time of disposal. At least one court has held
the difference in these definitions sufficient reason to adopt the active interpretation of disposa1.110
105. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the principle that statutes must
be construed so as to give every word meaning).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
107. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
108. Another way of phrasing this conclusion is to say that the polluter created the risk of
eventual environmental contamination, or the threat of release. For an example of a court
exploring the importance of the "so that such solid waste ... may enter the environment"
language, see United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1306 (E.D.N.C.
1982), revd., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
109. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(22) (1988).
110. See United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill.
1992). The Petersen court also relies heavily on the "innocent landowner" argument. See
supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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The Contextual Difference Between Present and Prior Owners

The difference between CERCLA's separate liability categories
for present and prior owners111 also demonstrates that Congress intended for the active definition of disposal to apply. Section
107(a)(1) imposes liability on any current owner of contaminated
land.112 Adopting a definition of disposal in section 107(a)(2) that
includes passive migration would also impose liability upon everyone who owned the land since the original pollution, because passive migration would make disposal a near-continuous process.113
Although one may question whether Congress intended to treat
previous owners differently from present owners,114 it seems reasonable - relying on a structural reading of CERCLA - to infer
that if Congress created two separate categories for liability, it must
have intended to reach two separate classes of defendants. 115 Ownership alone triggers 107(a)(1) liability; something more must be
required - for example, the temporal element of owning the land
during a disposal - to trigger 107(a)(2) liability. Interpreting
107(a)(2) such that all post-pollution owners face liability tends to
collapse the two categories of PRPs. Had Congress intended this
result, it probably would have said so directly rather than relying on
a tortuous construction of disposa1.116
111. Recall that§ 107(a)(l) renders liable "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility ... from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1988). Section 107(a)(2) establishes liability for
"any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
In other words, § 107(a)(l) covers present owners and § 107(a)(2) applies to previous
owners.
112. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). The
imposition of liability, of course, remains subject to the causation-based defenses, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) and discussed supra at note 11.
113. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (W.D. La.
1993) ("This court does not agree with [plaintiff's] contention that § 9607(a)(2) liability
should be extended to all prior owners solely on the basis that rainfall obviously causes hazardous materials to leach through the soil.").
114. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
115. See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572
(5th Cir. 1988) (using a structural reading of CERCLA's liability provisions to differentiate
between § 107(a)(l) and § 107(a)(2)); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (same).
116. Several courts adopting the active interpretation of disposal have commented on this
fact. See, e.g., Snediker Developers v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
("[A]ssuming that any hazardous waste may migrate long after it has been introduced into
the environment, [the passive reading's] sweeping interpretation of the term disposal would
effectively impose cleanup liability on any owner in a chain of title. The Court is satisfied
that if the drafters of CERCLA had intended such a far reaching consequence, they would
have said so explicitly."); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
("To define disposal as plaintiff wishes would effectively make all property owners from the
time a site became polluted (up to and including the current owner) potentially liable under
§ 9607(a)(2) even if these owners did not introduce the chemicals onto the site. Such a construction conflicts with the limited scope of§ 9607(a)(2).").
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The Implications of the Guilty Prior Landowner Provision

Buried amidst the definitions incorporated into CERCLA as
part of the 1986 SARA amendments lurks one of the most substantive, liability-generating provisions of the entire statute. Section
101(35) defines the phrase contractual relationship117 for purposes
of section 107(b)(3), which provides that a third-party defense is
not available if the third party's "act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship ... with the defendant."11 8 Section 101(35), however, also modifies the meaning of contractual
relationship so that innocent landowners escape liability.119 Section
101(35)(C) clarifies the scope of the innocent landowner defense.
It provides:
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) [the causationbased defense section] of this title shall diminish the liability of any
previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be
liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant
owned the real property and then subsequently transferred ownership
of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge,
such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of
this title and no [causation-based defense] shall be available to such
defendant. 120

This "guilty landowner provision" confirms the active definition
of disposal because the provision makes no sense if it were to coexist with the passive definition. The passive reading of disposal is
inconsistent with the provision in two separate ways. First, it would
imply that Congress intended innocent present owners to be treated
much better than innocent prior owners under CERCLA. Second,
it would imply that Congress chose arbitrarily to move PRPs already liable under one category to a different category when such a
change would have absolutely no effect.
The initial sentence of the provision clarifies that the innocent
landowner defense protects only present owners; prior owners are
not eligible. If Congress intended to adopt the passive reading of
disposal, tP,en almost all owners after the original pollution would
become liable as a consequence of passive migration on their
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
118. 42 u.s.c. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
119. Recall that the innocent landowner defense actually appears in the definitional section, by exempting certain transactions from the phrase contractual relationship. See supra
note 82 and accompanying text. Section 101(35)(A) establishes the elements of this innocent
landowner defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). Section 101(35)(B) establishes the due
diligence standard with which innocent landowners must comply before gaining eligibility for
the defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988).
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land.121 Some of these owners undoubtedly would "not know" or
would have "no reason to know" about the migration, which would
qualify them for the innocent landowner defense if they were pres·
ent owners. As prior owners, however, they would receive no pro·
tection from the innocent landowner provision because it
specifically restricts its effect to present owners. Thus, innocent
present owners would fare much better under CERCLA than
seemingly innocent prior owners for no apparent reason. The most
likely explanation for the fact that Congress excluded innocent
prior owners from the scope of the innocent landowner defense is
that Congress never intended to make innocent prior owners PRPs
at an.122
Adoption of the passive reading of disposal would also imply
that Congress wanted to reassign PRPs from one liability category
to another. The guilty prior landowner provision assigns liability
under section 107(a)(1) to prior landowners who gain actual knowl·
edge of the contamination. The effects such a provision would have
if Congress intended the passive definition of disposal to apply are
anomalous. Recall that under the passive reading most prior owners in the chain of title after the initial contamination would face
liability under section 107(a)(2) by virtue of the continuous nature
of hazardous waste migration.123 The effect of the provision, then,
would be to take guilty prior landowners already liable under section 107(a)(2) and to make them liable instead under section
107(a)(1). This explicit reassignment of liability would constitute
nothing but meaningless surplusage - PRPs liable under section
107(a)(1) do not face consequences any different from those liable
under section 107(a)(2) - and would seem bizarre. Certainly the
statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids this result;124 only
adoption of the active reading of disposal accomplishes this end. ·
IV. THE PURPOSES OF CERCLA
This Part examines Congress's purposes in enacting CERCLA
and concludes that use of the active reading of disposal is consistent
with those purposes.125 Congress enacted CERCLA with two goals
121. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
122. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 91-92 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect
to the de minimis settlement provision).
123. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
125. In construing a statute to give full effect to the intent of the legislature, courts may
look to the purpose of the statutory scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
337-38 (1950) ("The history of [the] statute, its original purpose, and its present status are all
relevant considerations in its interpretation."). If at all possible, the reviewing court should
give effect to the purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S.
377, 386 (1948) (" 'Words ... are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the
intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning •.. is to be arrived at not only by a consideration
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in mind - to enable the government to clean up inactive hazardous
waste sites and to make polluters bear the cost of cleanup.126 Section IV.A argues that the cleanup goal does not mandate adoption
of the passive definition of disposal. Section IV.B contends, on the
other hand, that the goal of imposing costs on polluters strongly
supports the active definition.
Enabling Government Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites
The primary purpose of CERCLA is to enable the government
to clean up abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites.127
Although many courts rely on this goal to construe liability under
CERCLA broadly and exceptions narrowly - on the apparent theory that the more entities liable under CERCLA, the better
equipped the Superfund will be to deal with hazardous waste
sites128 - this purpose should not be stretched to impose liability
beyond the limits in the statutory scheme.129 Judge Easterbrook,
writing for a Seventh Circuit panel, has forcefully addressed this
issue:
A.

When the liability may be large - it is costly to clean up polluted
sites - there is a chance that one or more of the firms that have
caused the problem will not have the assets necessary to set things
of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and
the circumstances under which the words were employed.'" (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell
Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937))).
126. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 {6th Cir. 1991)
("(CERCLA's] two essential purposes have been identified. First, Congress intended to pro·
vide the federal government with the tools ... for a swift and effective response to hazardous
waste sites. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for disposal of chemical poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."
(citations omitted)); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 {1st Cir. 1986); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986). Commentators
have underscored these two purposes of CERCLA:
CERCLA has two major purposes: the primary one is to enable the federal government
to swiftly clean up abandoned and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. CERCLA's secondary purpose is to make persons who were responsible for the improper disposal of
hazardous waste bear the cost and responsibility of cleaning it up.
FOGLEMAN, supra note 46, at 1 {footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Dennis J. Byrne, JonesHamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials: Chemical Supplier "Arranges" for CERCLA Liability, 23
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 213, 220 {1993) ("Courts applying CERCLA have cited two primary legislative purposes underlying the Act: to give governmental agencies the tools for
prompt and effective responses to such problems and to force those responsible for creating
the pollution to bear the costs of remedying the contamination.") (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[CER·
CLA] was designed primarily to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites ...• ");
see also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Walls); Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 {11th Cir. 1987) (same); J.V. Peters &
Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 {6th Cir. 1985) (same).
128. Many courts have taken this approach. For one example, see New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 {2d Cir. 1985).
129. See Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 {N.D. Cal. 1989) {"However
broad Congress may have intended the definition, Congressional intent does not justify the
distortion [of] the statute.").
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right. The prospect of a shortfall in assets means that someone else
(the public at large) must incur cleanup costs; victims may be left to
bear their own losses . . . . The designation of additional firms as
responsible ameliorates this problem and so helps to achieve statutory
aims....
It is not our function to design rules of liability from the gtound
up, however. We are enforcing a statute rather than modifying rules
of common law.... To the point that courts could achieve "more" of
the legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it
is enough to respond that statutes have not only ends but also limits.
Born of compromise, laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping points no less than to implement other legislative
choices.130
The first three Parts of this Note demonstrate that CERCLA contains such a "stopping point" in its definition of disposal. These
Parts show that Congress intended disposal to have an active meaning, thereby limiting the liability of prior landowners to those whose
affirmative actions contributed to the spread of hazardous waste.
In interpreting CERCLA, then, courts should not use broad, generalized goals, such as achieving maximal funds for cleanup, to ignore
the limits inherent in the most plausible reading of the statute.
B. Imposing Cleanup Costs on Polluters
CERCLA's secondary purpose - assuring that polluters bear
the costs of cleanup - also bears directly on the controversy over
the disposal definition. Construing disposal to include passive migration would spread the costs of cleanup to prior property owners
whose only sin consisted of owning land with leaky storage tanks
buried underneath, though they were quite ignorant of that fact.
The active reading of disposal ensures that liability under section
107(a)(2) rests squarely where it belongs: on the environmental
polluters who created the risk that hazardous waste would enter the
environment and who received the economic benefits of doing so,
and on those who discovered the contamination but refused to take
action to remedy the problem.
This equity argument may appear at first blush to overlook the
fact that current landowners clearly face liability without any degree of fault under section 107(a)(1).131 Nevertheless, CERCLA's
statutory scheme explicitly differentiates between present and prior
owners: prior owners face liability under section 107(a)(2) only if
they owned the land "at the time of disposal." 132 The disposal Ian130. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 9607{a){l) (1988).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9607{a){2) {1988).
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guage thus serves to qualify the liability imposed on prior owners
and to differentiate the legal standards for the two separate classes
of liability. As the Second Circuit has explained, "Congress intended to cover different classes of people differently•... [S]ection
[107(a)(2)]'s scope is more limited than that of section
[107(a)(1)]."133 Bound by the plain terms of CERCLA, courts must
impose liability upon current owners. Courts should not, however,
use the fact that Congress intended to apply very broad liability to
present owners in order to impose equally proad liability upon the
class of prior owners whose liability Congress expressly qualified by
adding the phrase at the time of disposal. 134
One court adopting the passive view of disposal, however, has
alleged that the active interpretation contravenes the purposes of
CERCLA by establishing a perverse set of incentives for the owners of land. This court argued that adoption of the active reading of
disposal allows owners of land who know that passive migration is
occurring on their land to do nothing and to allow the environmental contamination to spread unabated.13s So long as the landowner
manages to sell the land before response costs are incurred, the argument continues, the landowner could avoid liability for such conduct under the active definition. Interpreting CERCLA's liability
scheme so as to discourage voluntary cleanup appears to contravene the purposes of the statute.
This argument, however, makes three false assumptions. First,
the argument assumes that without a passive definition of disposal
CERCLA does not adequately deter sellers attempting to evade liability through fraudulent transfers of land. Such an assumption,
however, is patently untrue. CERCLA - as amended by SARA
- defines such a landowner as liable under section 101(35)(C).136
Because the landowner with knowledge faces mandatory liability as
a present owner even if the property is transferred, such a landowner faces no economic incentive to transfer ownership of the
land. The statute also provides for criminal penalties of fines and
133. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
135. In the course of rejecting a lower court's adoption of the active definition, the
Fourth Circuit stated:
Under the [active] view, an owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an
environmental hazard festers on his property. Such an owner could insulate himself
from liability by virtue of his passivity, so long as he transfers the proP.erty before any
response costs are incurred.... A CERCLA regime which rewards indifference to environmental hazards and discourages voluntary efforts at waste cleanup cannot be what
Congress had in mind.
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. a. 377 (1992). For one court's refutation of this argument, see United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
136. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
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imprisonment for landowners who refuse to report releases on their
property.131
Second, the argument assumes that the seller can easily rid herself of the contaminated property by way of a bad-faith transfer of
the property before incurring any response costs. CERCLA, however, provides many incentives for potential buyers to inspect carefully any potential land purchase in order to guard against
liability.138 Fmding the proverbial sucker on whom to unload land
containing hazardous waste may be far more difficult than anticipated by this skeptical court.
Finally, the argument assumes that federal law.must provide the
solution to the problem of the deceptive seller. State law, however,
has historically provided a rescission remedy for buyers who have
been victimized by sellers who misrepresent or who fail to disclose
dangerous latent defects in their real estate.139 In combination,
then, these three factors should establish a sufficient counter to any
disincentive that the CERCLA liability scheme appears to provide.
V. CONCLUSION
The definition of disposal in RCRA as incorporated by reference in CERCLA seems ambiguous as to whether affirmative conduct is required for liability to attach to prior owners. The
interpretive question is whether Congress intended disposal to have
an active or a passive meaning. The plain meaning of the definitional language, although it points tentatively to the active construction, does not answer this question. The histories of RCRA and
CERCLA, however, tend to support the active interpretation. Finally, the structure and purposes of CERCLA confirm the active .
meaning of disposal.
Adopting the passive interpretation amounts to taking one word
- leaking - out of its context in the definition and ignoring alternative definitions. This approach runs contrary to settled principles
of statutory construction. It would arbitrarily impose liability along
the entire chain of ownership of a parcel of land after any initial
contamination. It would eviscerate a defense for innocent purchas137. 42 u.s.c. § 9603 (1988).
138. The fact that CERCLA imposes strict liability without fault on present landowners
regardless of the time of release is the primary incentive of this type. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(l) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (providing that in order to qualify for the innocent purchaser defense, the potential claimant must not have had reason to
know of any contamination).
139. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Glickman, 50 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 51 N.Y.S.2d
96 (App. Div.), second appeal denied, 51 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1944); Lawson v. Citizens & S. Natl.
Bank of S.C., 193 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 1972); see also REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs
§ 161 cmt. d (1979) ("A seller of real or personal property is, for example, ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent defect of quality or title that is of such a character as would
probably prevent the bu!er from buying at the contract price."); id. § 161 cmt. d, illus. 4.
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ers specifically adopted by Congress to protect them from the
harshness of the CERCLA liability scheme. Finally, it would be
inconsistent with the statute as a whole and would render other
provisions of the statute beyond understanding.
By adopting the active interpretation, courts better comply with
congressional intent. The active reading reflects a superior understanding of the delicate compromise that resulted in CERCLA's
scheme of liability. It protects prior landowners who committed no
environmental wrong. Most importantly, however, adoption of the
active interpretation of disposal ensures that section 107(a)(2) liability falls where it was intended: on those entities that received the
economic benefits of introducing the hazardous substances into the
environment or that refused to halt the spread of such substances
when they had the chance.

